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Abstract— The New Atheism is representative of a series of best selling post‐9/11 books written by philosopher
Sam Harris, biologist Richard Dawkins, philosopher Daniel Dennett, journalist Christopher Hitchens, and
physicist Victor Stenger. These writings underscore the intellectual and moral shortcomings of religion,
especially religion centered on worship of God. More aggressive than their predecessors, most of the “New
Atheists” are not satisfied with disbelief in God. They claim that a commitment to science, reason, and morality
is inconsistent with theism. Using as my point of departure the neoclassical philosophy of the logician‐
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, the priest‐palaeontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and the
philosopher‐ornithologist Charles Hartshorne, I argue that the New Atheism is intellectually anaemic, interesting
though it is as political activism. The New Atheists criticize a caricature of faith, offer inferior versions of old
arguments, commit the creationists’ mistake of construing theism as a scientific hypothesis, and ignore
sophisticated forms of belief in God.
Keywords— New Atheism, Neoclassical Philosophy, Process Theism, Shared Creativity, Whitehead, Hartshorne,
Teilhard de Chardin, Victor Stenger, Metaphysical Claims, Scientism.

The voice on the other end was Sergeant Reed of Homicide.
“You still looking for God?”
“Yeah.”
“An all‐power [sic] Being? Great Oneness, Creator of the Universe? First Cause of All Things?”
“That’s right.”
“Somebody with that description just showed up at the morgue. You better get down here right
away.”
It was Him all right, and from the looks of Him it was a professional job.
— Woody Allen (1978) Getting Even p. 108

According to the Times of London, atheism was one
of the biggest news stories of 2006. Daniel
Dennett’s Breaking the Spell and Richard Dawkins’
The God Delusion helped to make it so. Sam
Harris’s Letter to a Christian Nation, which was a
follow up to his earlier book, The End of Faith, also
topped the lists. Atheist bestsellers like Victor J.
Stenger’s God: the Failed Hypothesis and
Christopher Hitchens’ god is not Great (the eye
catching lower case “g” is intentional) were to
follow. These authors are the vanguard of what is
being called the New Atheism or neo‐atheism.

Each author, in one way or another, calls for an
end to faith in the name of reason. The common
thread connecting them is the belief that the
deliverances of science and more generally an
adherence to the methods of science are inimical
to theism. Like the detective in Woody Allen’s
parody who finds God in the morgue, murdered by
a disgruntled scientist, so the sleuths of the New
Atheism have concluded that God does not exist,
and it is the success of reason and science that
have finally put the ancient myth to rest.
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Predictably, replies to the New Atheism are legion
(e.g. Dawkins and Collins 2006; Plantinga 2007;
McGrath 2007; Viney 2007b; Bowman 2007;
McBain 2007; Bellah 2008; Aikman 2008). Dawkins
keeps track of responses to his work on his
website. Citing the line by W. B. Yeats—“But was
there ever dog that praised his fleas?”—Dawkins
and Dawkinsians refer to the responders
themselves as fleas. It is a humorous, if demeaning,
image; but perhaps the “fleas” should not protest,
especially if they are philosophers. Socrates called
himself a gadfly. He believed that his fellow
Athenians had grown morally lazy and he was to be
a public servant whose divinely appointed purpose
was to remind them of the value of seeking virtue.
The New Atheists pride themselves on their
devotion to science, but if they have grown
intellectually lazy, then we fleas—divinely
appointed or otherwise—can encourage them to
do better. In light of what I will say about the New
Atheism, “fleas” could be read as an acronym:
Fallacies in the Logic and Eristic of Atheistic
Scientism.
Since atheism is not new one may ask what exactly
is new about the New Atheism. The consistent
message of the fleas is that, as far as intellectual
substance is concerned, the New Atheism is a
parade of old arguments. After all, the New
Atheists have not improved on the critiques of the
Bible sprinkled throughout Voltaire’s Philosophical
Dictionary and in the second part of Paine’s The
Age of Reason. The New Atheists’ skepticism about
theistic arguments and their arguments against
God’s existence are mostly inferior versions of
what one finds in Hume’s Dialogues. The New
Atheists’ social comments on religion make many
of the same points that were made more
memorably by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. Finally,
they share Bertrand Russell’s jaded view of
religion, while adding examples to his list of the ills
visited upon humanity by bad religion (1957, 24‐
47). On the other hand, Hitchens can be thanked
for editing a new anthology of atheist and proto‐
atheist writings, from ancient times to the present,
including excerpts from the New Atheists’ works
(2007b).
Despite the New Atheists’ lack of originality, their
popularity indicates that their frustrations strike a
responsive chord. There is, to be sure, a new
political climate: for example, the profound
influence of the Christian right in government,
medicine, and education. The New Atheists take
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special delight in tilting at creationist windmills. On
this issue, however, the New Atheists are allies
with both Catholicism and most mainline
Protestant denominations for they too have
disavowed creationism and intelligent design as
legitimate science. The horror of religiously
inspired terrorism clearly casts a long shadow, as
the subtitle of Harris’s first book makes clear: The
End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of
Reason. Terrorism apparently triggered Dawkins’
anti‐religious ire as well. He ended one of his public
addresses by explaining that the events of
September 11, 2001 had changed him. “Let’s stop
being so damned respectful,” he fumed (Dawkins
2002). The specter of terrorism in the name of
religion may be one reason why the New Atheists
are not affected by angst over the death of God
such as one finds in Dostoyevsky and Sartre. Nor is
there any evidence of nostalgia for God such as
one finds in Camus’s later work. On the contrary,
they are happy to be rid of the being that Dawkins
characterizes as a “cruel ogre” (2006, 250).
One cannot help but admire—or at least be
amazed by—the moral energy, evangelistic zeal,
and audacious self‐promotion of the New Atheists.
Dawkins’ explicit purpose is to invite fellow
atheists to be as militant as he is. He advocates
“atheist pride” based upon the supposed fact that
atheism “nearly always indicates a healthy
independence of mind…” (2006, 3). To be more
precise, it is not simply a “healthy independence of
mind” in which Dawkins takes pride; the source of
a specifically atheist pride is in using one’s
intellectual powers to resist faith in any sort of
deity. Dawkins argues that anyone who disbelieves
in a god—Zeus, for example—is an atheist with
respect to that god. For this reason, he remarks
with devilish wit that he and his fellow neo‐atheists
simply disbelieve in one less god than traditional
monotheists (2006, 53). Dawkins clearly intends his
critique not to be concept‐specific. He writes, “I am
not attacking any particular version of God or gods.
I am attacking God, all gods, anything and
everything supernatural, wherever and whenever
they have been or will be invented” (2006, 36). The
tip‐off that Dawkins’ critique is more concept‐
specific than he realizes is in his use of the word
“supernatural.” The concept of God in terms of
which he and other neo‐atheists are most
concerned to define disbelief is the supernatural
creator who exists over against the natural, space‐
time, universe and who is disclosed in revelation,
miraculously intervening in the natural world from
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time to time (Dawkins 2006, 31; cf. Hitchens
2007a, 11‐12, 41).
The idea of God as a supernatural creator is the
most popular form of theism, but it is
demonstrably not the only form worthy of
consideration. More than forty years ago, Schubert
Ogden put the point this way:
Among the most significant intellectual
achievements of the twentieth century has been
the creation at last of a neoclassical alternative
to the metaphysics and philosophical theology
of our classical tradition. Especially through the
work of Alfred North Whitehead and, in the area
usually designated “natural theology,” of
Charles Hartshorne, the ancient problems of
philosophy have received a new, thoroughly
modern treatment, which in its scope and depth
easily rivals the so‐called philosophia perennis
(1965, 56).

Hartshorne began using the expression
“neoclassical” in his seventh book (1962), but the
alternative to which Ogden refers is also called
“process theism” and “process‐relational theism”
because of its emphasis on becoming, temporal
flux, sociality, relativity, and evolution as
metaphysically basic (Loomer 1971; Loomer 1987;
Viney 2004). Arguably, the French scientist‐priest
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin belongs alongside
Whitehead and Hartshorne as a co‐founder of
neoclassical theism (Viney 2006a); but his work has
often been misunderstood by failing to take into
account the fact that he felt obliged to work
“underground” to express his metaphysical views
(Viney 2006b).
Two of the New Atheists whose works I have cited
are scientists (Dawkins and Stenger), but all of
them revere science as the most reliable avenue to
what is rationally acceptable in the way of belief.
The founders of process metaphysics were
themselves well schooled in the canons of science.
Whitehead first became famous for his ground‐
breaking work in mathematics, logic, and the
philosophy of science. Similarly, Teilhard was
known throughout his life primarily as a major
contributor to our knowledge of the evolutionary
origins of humans (Aczel 2007). Finally, although
Hartshorne is best remembered for his work in
philosophical theology, his first book straddled the
fields of psychology and philosophy (Hartshorne
1934) and he had a secondary expertise in
ornithology (Hartshorne 1973). Hartshorne also
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had a life‐long interest in the relations of
philosophy, religion, and science as evidenced by
his published and unpublished responses to
scientists he admired who had expressed an
opinion on the theistic question—Carl Sagan, E. O.
Wilson, and Stephen Weinberg (Hartshorne 1991,
1994; see also Sagan 1992 and Hartshorne 1995).
Since the time of Whitehead, Teilhard, and
Hartshorne, a cadre of philosophers and
theologians has defended process theism as
superior to atheism and to supernaturalism.
Despite being a minority voice, neoclassical
thinkers have been influential. As one might
expect, given the grounding in science of
neoclassicism’s founders, process thinkers have
brought fresh perspectives to the problem of the
interrelations of science and religion (e.g. Barbour
1990; Griffin 2000). In addition, process‐relational
thinking was largely responsible for dissolving the
previous consensus within the philosophy of
religion that an entirely absolute deity should be
considered normative for theology (e.g.
Hartshorne 1948). More importantly, neoclassical
theism expanded the live options (in William
James’s sense) for thinking about God and about
God’s relation to the world beyond simplistic
divisions like traditional theism, pantheism, deism,
or atheism (e.g. Hartshorne and Reese 2000).
Finally, it is worth noting that neoclassical thinkers
have highlighted the advantages of a process
hermeneutic for Scripture (e.g. Ford 1978; Gnuse
2000; Cobb and Lull 2005) and they have been at
the forefront of discussions that concern the
interface of theology with ecology (e.g. Cobb
1995), economics (e.g. Daly and Cobb 1994), and
social justice (e.g. Pittenger 1976; Davaney 1981;
Cobb 1982; Dombrowski 1988). To those energized
by neoclassical perspectives, Hitchens’ declaration
that religion spoke “its last intelligible or noble or
inspiring words a long time ago . . .” (2007a, 7)
rings hollow.
Since process theists remain a minority (more so in
philosophy than in theology), it is possible to
ignore their arguments without being accused of
being ignorant, even if one is, or of arguing from
false alternatives, even if that is what one is doing.
However, the New Atheists’ attitude to
alternatives to supernaturalism is a blanket
dismissal of them as unworthy of attention.
Stenger refers to “highly abstracted concepts of a
god” developed by sophisticated theologians that
would be unrecognizable to typical believers (2007,
112). Harris is more strident, stating that “religious
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moderation [of which process theism is an
example] is the product of secular knowledge and
scriptural ignorance—it has no bona fides, in
religious terms, to put it on a par with
fundamentalism” (2004, 21). Unhappily, it is typical
of the New Atheist polemic to expect
fundamentalism to contain the best that religion
can offer. In any event, those who accept
neoclassical theism often began their religious
journeys as “typical believers” (whatever that
might mean), but they view their spiritual growth
not as a loss of genuine faith but as a discovery (or
a recovery) of it. Moreover, it would be fatuous to
suppose they are ignorant of Scripture. Thus, neo‐
atheists should be encouraged to keep their minds
open—a quality they admire in themselves—about
alternative forms of theism. If they persist in
ignoring the neoclassical alternative, perhaps they
could refrain from belittling religious moderation.
They could follow the example of A. J. Ayer, the
chief spokesperson for logical positivism. After
dabbling in Whitehead’s Process and Reality, Ayer
reports that he found it “obscure” but that he had
“enough respect for Whitehead to think there was
probably more to it than [he] understood” (1977,
275).
The New Atheists are either unaware of or
unconcerned with neoclassical theism. In either
case, they have not done their philosophical or
theological homework. They can be credited with
rehearsing the case against fundamentalism, but
the intellectual poverty of fundamentalism will not
be news to most philosophers and theologians,
least of all to those in the neoclassical tradition. On
the contrary, the New Atheists should learn that
fundamentalism and the biblical literalism with
which it is associated are aberrations from the
normative streams of Christian theology (Viney
2007a). The arguments of the New Atheists are a
textbook example of the fallacy of arguing from a
non‐exhaustive disjunction, where one of the
missing alternatives is a form of theism that is at
least as metaphysically compelling, scientifically
sophisticated, and theologically literate as any yet
conceived. In my view, others have argued
convincingly that the New Atheist case against the
historically dominant and most sophisticated forms
of supernaturalism is a dismal failure (cf. Crean
2007 and D’Souza 2007). My concern, however, is
with what I see as New Atheism’s failure vis‐à‐vis
neoclassical theism. (For those coming closest to
the critique I espouse see: Ward 2006; Haught
2008; Cobb 2008).
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A mainstay of the New Atheism is the
incompatibility of faith and reason. The view of
Sam Harris provides an interesting case study. He
says that faith, in its ordinary scriptural sense, is
“belief in, and life orientation toward, certain
historical and metaphysical propositions” (2004,
65). He also maintains that persons are not free to
believe something for which they have no evidence
(2004, 62, 71). In the case of faith, however, Harris
claims that the evidence is always insufficient. “The
truth,” he assures his readers, “is that religious
faith is simply unjustified belief in matters of
ultimate concern.” He continues, “Faith is what
credulity becomes when it finally achieves escape
velocity from the constraints of terrestrial
discourse—constraints
like
reasonableness,
internal coherence, civility, and candor” (2004, 65).
Thus, for Harris, faith is a type of belief whose
evidence is woefully inadequate. Religious people
are not generally delusional, he concedes, but their
beliefs are. Accordingly, he suggests that “it is
difficult to imagine a set of beliefs more suggestive
of mental illness than those that lie at the heart of
many of our religious traditions” (2004, 72).
What are we to make of such claims? Neoclassical
thinkers certainly address matters relevant to faith
in what Harris identifies as the “ordinary scriptural
sense,” for they talk about historical and
metaphysical propositions that are matters of
ultimate concern; but they do not just talk about
them, they argue their case and they are fully
cognizant of the methods and deliverances of
science, which Harris also champions (2004, 73‐
77). Harris is aware of theologians—he mentions
Paul Tillich—who argue their case and thus deny,
at least in practice, a strict dichotomy between
faith and reason. Harris finesses this inconvenient
fact with what might be called an argument from
italics. He identifies those who “really believe”
(2004, 13, 22, note the italics) in God as those who
hold nonnegotiable ethical views and who are
willing to die, to kill others, and to send others to
be killed in the name of metaphysical absurdities.
He claims that liberals and moderates in theology
“don’t know what it is like to really believe in God”
(2006, 83, again, note the italics). Apparently, in
Harris’s universe, you cannot really believe in God
unless you are a fanatic or willing to be one. What
of those who are not willing to be fanatics because
they believe in a God of unlimited love and
forgiveness who demands the same of us? By
Harris’s italics argument, they do not really believe
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in God. Clearly, the definitional dog is here chasing
its tail.
The element of truth in Harris’s discussion is that
faith indeed involves, in the words of John Haught,
“a commitment of one’s whole being to God”
(Haught 2008, 5). One of the problems, however,
with Harris’s view is that it fails to account for the
specific content of faith. For example, from a New
Testament standpoint, the particular content of
faith is the revelation of God as a being of
unlimited love—in the pithy phrase of the first
epistle of John: “God is love” (I Jn. 4:7). This
statement serves at once as the metaphysical and
ethical ground of Christian faith. The consistent
message of Jesus is that one is to love God with
one’s entire being: heart, mind, soul, and strength,
and to love one’s neighbor as oneself (Mk. 12:29‐
31; Mt. 22:37‐40; Lk. 10:25‐28; cf. Jn. 13:34‐35).
Paul is in line with this thinking in his great hymn to
love, which is a favorite at weddings. Paul ends
with these words, “And now faith, hope, and love
abide, these three; and the greatest of these is
love” (I Cor. 13:13). Appealing to Harris’s penchant
for arguing from italics, we can ask: what would it
mean to really believe in the God of love? At the
very least, really believing in such a God is wildly
inconsistent with the fanatical and violent behavior
of religious extremists.
One may go further. The loving orientation
towards life that Jesus advocates—apart from
which a life of Christian faith is inconceivable—
arguably includes the use of reason as an
indispensable element. The first of the great
commandments is that one is to love God with
everything one is, including one’s mind. If “mind”
denotes our capacity to reason, to seek truth, to
form theories, and indeed to engage in science,
then the life of the mind is integral to the life of
faith. Of course, neoclassical philosophy, precisely
because it is philosophy, is not sectarian. Teilhard,
it is true, was a Christian, but his metaphysical
speculations are not derived from doctrinal
statements. In any event, neither Whitehead nor
Hartshorne were Christians and neither set out to
build a Christian philosophy, although elements of
Christian thinking are evident in their work. For
example, Hartshorne always endeavored to keep
love as the focus of his philosophy. He wrote to
Edgar Sheffield Brightman in 1934 that he intended
to show that all concepts in his metaphysics get
their meaning from “deus est caritas” (Auxier and
Davies 2001, 14). In the Library of Living
Philosophers volume dedicated to him, Hartshorne
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said that the basic clue in all of his thinking was
love (Hahn 1991, 634). A few pages later, he
explained that his “ultimate intuitive clue in
philosophy is that ‘God is love’ and that the idea of
God is definable as that of the being worthy to be
loved with all one’s heart, mind, soul, and entire
being” (Hahn 1991, 700).
Harris’s
petitio
against
reasoned
faith
notwithstanding, the New Atheists insist that
science puts the lie to what I am calling the
particular content of faith. Even if God is
characterized as unfailing love, this still entails that
there is a being that is so characterized, in short
that God exists. The New Atheists, however, agree
with Hitchens when he says that “the metaphysical
claims of religion are false” (2007a, 63). Dawkins
and Harris agree that belief in God is delusional
(Harris 2004, 72; Dawkins 2006, 5). Dawkins titles
one of his chapters, “Why there almost certainly is
no God.” Stenger too says that “we can be pretty
sure” that no such being as God exists (2007, 18).
The New Atheists seem in basic agreement with
Dawkins that theism is best considered as a
scientific hypothesis (2006, 2, 50). Thus, Stenger’s
book is devoted almost entirely to a search for
gaps in our scientific account of the world that
might be filled by the explanation, “God did it.”
Finding no feasible candidates, Stenger announces
the conclusion in the title of his book: God, the
Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows That God
Does Not Exist. The New Atheists are not saying
that everything is presently explained by science,
but they are saying that (a) scientific explanations
are the only explanations that count as legitimate
explanations, and that (b) the God hypothesis fails
as a scientific explanation. Anything God might
have explained (e.g. an organism’s fitness to its
environment) is better explained in other ways
(e.g. descent with modification and natural
selection), so the explanatory value of God is nil.
God is otiose.
There can be no doubt that some philosophers and
theologians have used concepts of God to propose
answers to questions raised in science. Not
surprisingly, these are the favored targets of the
New Atheists. Stenger, for example, canvasses the
standard replies to the evolution‐deniers and the
proponents of intelligent design (ID), beginning
with William Paley’s watch‐maker analogy and
ending with Michael Behe’s concept of irreducible
complexity (Stenger 2007, 47‐75). In this, he is
preceded by Dawkins (2006, 119‐134) and by
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Hitchens (2007a, 73‐96). Of course, equally
convincing rebuttals of scientific creationism and
ID, written by theists (Pennock 1999; Miller 1999;
Lamoureux 1999), have been available for many
years. For the most part, the New Atheists
grudgingly applaud these efforts, but they are
puzzled why their theistic allies do not take the
next step and deny that God exists. Stenger puts
the challenge best. He outlines what he calls “the
generic argument” concerning God’s existence.
The crux of the argument is that one assumes a
concept of God for which “objective evidence”
(Stenger means “scientific evidence”) can be
found; if the evidence confirms God’s existence
then one should conclude that God may exist; if
the evidence disconfirms God’s existence, then one
should conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt” that
God as defined in the original hypothesis does not
exist (2007, 43). Stenger concedes that he is
crossing the admittedly fuzzy line where absence
of evidence becomes evidence of absence (2007,
18). In general, the failure of an argument for X is
not the same as an argument for not‐X. If,
however, one has reason to believe that the
relevant evidence has been exhausted, the
negative conclusion may be drawn. If you do not
see a blue whale in your bathtub, it is usually taken
as sufficient evidence that there is not one there to
be seen. Stenger believes that, in the case of God’s
existence, the relevant evidence has been
exhausted; thus, his confidence that “we can be
pretty sure” that God does not exist.
We may agree with the New Atheists that God’s
existence fails as a scientific hypothesis. However,
if the existence of God is not best considered as a
scientific hypothesis or if scientific explanations are
not the only legitimate explanations, then we
cannot be pretty sure that God does not exist. It is
well to remember that relatively few philosophers
have framed the question of God’s existence in
terms amenable to scientific testing or
investigation. Plato’s arguments for the demiurge
and the world‐soul—which process thinkers often
interpret as two aspects of a single deity
(Hartshorne and Reese 2000, 38‐57; Eslick 1982;
Dombrowski 2005)—are not intended to be
scientific. Aristotle’s unmoved mover is not a
product of scientific reasoning. Medieval thinkers
who are well‐known for their theistic arguments
(e.g. Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, Aquinas,
and Duns Scotus) were doing metaphysics, not
science. The same is true of the modern
philosophers who developed theistic arguments:
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Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Clarke, and Leibniz. It
is true that some English thinkers (we have already
mentioned Paley) began to construe the
teleological argument in more scientific terms, but
this represents a departure from the dominant
tradition. Contemporary philosophers who argue
for God’s existence are still prone to treat the
questions to which “God exists” might be the
answer as, in the words of Richard Swinburne, “too
big” for science (2004, 160, 172). Neoclassical
thinkers are, in this sense, in the mainstream of
philosophy, for they too argue that God’s existence
is not best considered as a scientific hypothesis.
The case for (or against) God’s existence is a job for
metaphysicians, not scientists.
Why have philosophers in general, and neoclassical
thinkers in particular, viewed God’s existence as a
problem for metaphysics rather than science? The
simplest answer is because the work of science
presupposes a world of phenomena (literally,
appearances) to explain but does not explain why
there should be a world at all. Metaphysics is the
discipline that addresses this and other questions
about the fundamental nature of existence. Hence,
it is common to characterize metaphysics as the
inquiry into the nature of being qua being. I prefer
to define metaphysics as the inquiry into the nature
of existence and its ultimate explanations. The
problem of God is metaphysical since, if such a
thing exists, then it would count as an ultimate
explanation of the universe. It is arguably part of
the meaning of “God”—the concept used by the
aforementioned philosophers—that the universe
requires that God exists but that God does not
require the existence of anything in the universe.
In other words, nothing whose existence is
produced by particular objects or processes within
the universe is God. It follows that any argument
for the existence of God that depends upon the
premise that everything has a cause is self‐
defeating, for it entails that God’s existence is
caused. William Lane Craig’s (1980) schemat‐
izations of cosmological arguments from Plato to
Leibniz demonstrate that none of these
philosophers argued for God’s existence from the
premise that everything has a cause. This is not so
surprising since these thinkers didn’t enter the
philosophical pantheon by making sophomoric
errors. For this reason, it is disappointing for Daniel
Dennett to repeat Bertrand Russell’s mistake of
treating this self‐defeating argument as though it
were taken seriously by great theists (Dennett
2006, 242; Russell 1997). If one is a theist, then one
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should claim that at least one thing is without a
cause, namely, God’s existence.
Neoclassical philosophy makes a number of
contributions to this discussion, but the most basic
is its fundamental hypothesis that every real being,
from the lowliest creature to the greatest, is a
creative process that appropriates data from its
past actual world into a relatively novel synthesis;
the new entity thereby becomes a fresh datum for
subsequent creative processes. In Whitehead’s
words, “the many become one, and are increased
by one” (1978, 21). The metaphysical hypothesis of
process thought is that beneath no enduring
object—rocks, plants, animals, etc. (Whitehead
calls them societies)—is there an unchanging
subject of change; rather there is a sequence of
momentary processes (Whitehead calls them
actual entities), each of which actively grasps its
predecessors and is actively grasped by its
successors (Whitehead calls this “grasping”
prehension). Such is the rhythm of the universe
that every act of becoming is in part created (by its
past) and in part creator (of what is in the future).
What occurs at the ever dynamic interstices where
future potential becomes past actuality is the self‐
creativity of every actual entity, each one adding
its contribution—great or small, good or bad—to
the creative advance.
The concept of reality as a growing whole dovetails
nicely with common experience and with the
deliverances of science. The world‐weary says,
“There is nothing new under the sun” (Eccl. 1:9),
but why take this lament uncritically as the final
metaphysical truth? Astronomy teaches that the
sun itself was once new, and what occurs “under
the sun” is an ever shifting mosaic of the new
emerging from the old. The layers of fossils in the
earth tell the story of the successive appearance of
plant and animal species, each continuous with but
different from its ancestors. At the level of culture,
there are novel forms of art, music, literature,
architecture, technology, and governments—new
cultural forms appear not from nothing, but
neither are they nothing like the old. To be sure,
there can be long periods of relative stasis where
very little changes or where changes are so
insignificant that they make no appreciable
difference in things. But matter itself, at every level
open to our inspection, is a far cry from the clock‐
work mechanism imagined by early scientists.
Modern science makes us ever more aware that
the universe is buzzing with activity—from the
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indeterminacies of quantum reality to the groping
of evolution.
Neoclassical thinkers agree on this processive view
of nature; but not all follow Whitehead, Teilhard,
and Hartshorne in being theists (e.g. Ferré 2001;
Crosby 2002). Nevertheless, there is agreement
that the concept of a universe in process has
important implications for the idea of God. Let me
highlight three of them: First, whereas traditional
theists placed God beyond time, change, and
contingency, process theists emphasize that God
necessarily affects and is affected by processes in
the universe. The traditional idea of God as pure
act means, among other things, that God acts upon
others but is never acted upon by another. In
process thought, God, like every other real being,
acts and is acted upon. As Hartshorne was fond of
saying (expanding on Abraham Heschel’s
theology), God is not the unmoved mover; God is
the most and best moved mover (Hartshorne 1997,
6, 39; Heschel, 24; Viney 2006c). Second, in
contrast to traditional theism that understood God
alone as having the power of creation, neoclassical
philosophy posits a protean creativity that is
pluralized into as many acts of becoming as fill the
universe. Neoclassical metaphysics is a philosophy
of shared creativity, which is to say, shared power.
Perfect or divine power is not the power to
unilaterally determine what happens; rather, it is a
uniquely excellent influence over all other entities
that retain some power of their own. Third, on the
traditional view, the temporal world is the creation
of God; therefore, God is eternal, not temporal. In
neoclassical metaphysics, the creation of the
temporal world is an on‐going and open‐ended
process, shared by God and the creatures. Because
the process of universe‐creation is never complete,
there can be no eternal perspective of a completed
universe such as traditional theism imagined God
to possess. Omniscience is then the knowledge of
what has been (the past), what is occurring (the
present), and what must be and what may or may
not be (the future)—divine knowledge of the
future includes knowledge of the degree to which
it is open or closed.
Despite this reasoning, process theists are
commonly said to believe in a God that is limited in
knowledge and power (cf. George 2003, 8; Layman
2007, 107; Steele 2008, 8). This is, however, a red
herring. The pons asinorum of debates concerning
neoclassical theism is that concepts of God are
correlative with concepts of the things to which
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God is said to be or not to be in relation. To claim
that God knows the future as present requires that
the future be the sort of thing that can be present
from a certain perspective. If the future is not the
sort of thing that can be present from a certain
perspective, then God cannot know it as present.
Neoclassicism affirms that the future is a field of
possibility of what will be and what may be only, to
borrow a phrase from Charles Dickens (1967, 128).
If this is correct, then it is this mixture of necessity
and possibility that would be the object of divine
knowing. Neoclassical philosophers make an
analogous argument with respect to divine power.
To claim, with traditional theism, that God can
unilaterally bring about any state of affairs requires
that all states of affairs are such that a single being
can bring them about. If some states of affairs are
such that a single being cannot bring them about,
then not even God can unilaterally bring about just
any state of affairs. Teilhard asked in 1953, “And
who then will finally give evolution its God?” (1969,
288). Arguably, it is the philosophers and
theologians of the neoclassical tradition.
The dual nature of God—moved and mover—is
one reason that neoclassical theism is also known
as dipolar theism. Hartshorne’s way of expressing
dipolarity is to draw a three‐fold distinction of
logical type among existence (that a thing is),
essence (what a thing is), and actuality (the
particular state in which a thing is). Suppose a
person is listening to a bird sing (like Hartshorne
researching birdsong). In order to have this actual
experience he must have a certain essence that
includes the cognitive capacity to listen and, of

Creatures

Actuality

Essence

Existence

course, he must exist. The distinction between
actuality and essence‐existence is a distinction of
logical type because it corresponds to the
distinction between the concrete and the abstract.
One can infer that the man exists and that he has
certain cognitive capacities from the fact that he is
listening to the bird; however, from the fact that
he exists and that he has certain cognitive
capacities, it does not follow that he is listening to
the bird. The same triad—and the same
correspondence of the concrete and the abstract—
applies to God: the actual hearing of the bird
singing (and of knowing the man as hearing the
bird), the essential cognitive capacity, which in
deity is omniscience, and God’s existence. Thus, as
a person’s identity as an enduring individual may
be embodied in different experiences, so God’s
character as the perfection of love, knowledge, and
power may be embodied in different concrete
ways.
Although the triad of actuality / essence /
existence applies in both the divine and creaturely
cases, the modalities associated with each need
not be the same. In both the human and divine
cases, the experience is contingent (meaning, it can
not be); for example, the man could have been
asleep or the bird might have been silent. On the
other hand, the man’s cognitive capacity is
contingent whereas God’s is necessary (meaning, it
cannot not be). Likewise, the man’s existence is
contingent and God’s is necessary (Figure 1).
Because Hartshorne maintained that existence and
essence in God are necessary, he often

God

Man listening
to bird singing
(contingent)

God knowing the man
as listening to the bird
(contingent)

Human nature as
including various
cognitive capacities
(contingent)

God as knowing
whatever is knowable,
i.e. as omniscient
(necessary)

The man existing
(contingent)

God existing
(necessary)

Concrete

Abstract

Figure 1: Actuality / Essence / Existence (Viney 2007c, 347).
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abbreviated the three‐fold distinction as existence
and actuality. David Tracy refers to this distinction
as “Hartshorne’s discovery,” for it provides, for the
first time in the history of philosophy, a plausible
account of how to combine belief in God as a
necessary being with belief that God has
contingent properties (1985, 259). (For reasons too
technical for this presentation, the “discovery”
cannot be attributed to Whitehead—see Griffin
2001, 152).
We are now positioned to understand why
neoclassical theism is not a version of
supernaturalism. Traditional theism is a
supernaturalism in at least two senses. First, it
posits a two‐tiered metaphysic: the creator (God)
and the created order (the creatures). The basis of
this distinction is that God alone has the power to
create, to bring something from nothing (i.e. from
no pre‐existing material—creatio ex nihilo). A
created being can make something from
something else, but no creature can make
something from nothing. In neoclassical
metaphysics, all creativity, including God’s,
requires antecedent “material” from which to
create and no actual entity, not even a creaturely
one, is wholly uncreative. Process theism makes
principled distinctions between the divine and the
non‐divine, but it does not do so based on the
nature of creativity. Hence, it is not in this sense a
version of supernaturalism.
Traditional theism is a version of supernaturalism
in another way: it posits a two layered cosmos in
which supernatural beings are essentially non‐
material (e.g. angels) and natural beings are
essentially embodied (e.g. gorillas); There are
differences about which side of the material / non‐
material divide human persons fall. Christians from
Augustine to Aquinas held that human persons are
essentially embodied (hence, the need for the
resurrection of the body for an after‐life); but
some, like Descartes, held that human persons can
exist apart from the body (a view more consonant
with doctrines of the immortality of the soul and of
reincarnation). Process theists follow Whitehead in
objecting to this “bifurcation of nature” into the
material and the non‐material. On the one hand,
this means that there is no such thing as a pure
spirit. Even God, although without physical
location, is material. Hartshorne preferred the
metaphor that the world is God’s body. On the
other hand, no actual entity is devoid of what in
ourselves we call experience. This does not mean
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that all things are conscious, for there can be, as
Leibniz held, many kinds of experience, but process
thought has a richer idea of the physical world than
is usual. In Teilhard’s metaphor, “Coextensive with
their Without [the physical] there is a Within [the
psychic] of Things” (1955, 53).
The existence of a cosmic order naturally presents
itself as a problem in any metaphysic, like
neoclassicism, that takes the dynamic processes of
nature as basic. How is it possible for the multitude
of centers of activity scattered across the cosmos
to add up to an ordered whole? The question is not
how some forms of order within the universe arise
from other forms of order. For example, it is the
job of evolutionary science, not of metaphysics, to
explain how humans evolved from their proto‐
human ancestors. The metaphysical question, on
the other hand, is about order on a cosmic scale.
Hartshorne stresses the distinction between order
within a universe of partly self‐determining
entities, such as process metaphysics imagines,
and the order of such a universe. Localized forms
of order are incapable of explaining cosmic order
precisely because they presuppose it. To speak of a
form of order that is localized is already to posit a
larger domain in which location is possible—in a
word, one imagines an ordered whole. For
example, there must have been a time when atoms
of hydrogen and oxygen fused for the first time. At
that point, water molecules, with all of their
possibilities for specialized forms of aquatic life,
were born. This event was possible only because
there was already a more inclusive order in terms
of which atoms could exist. If cosmic order is to be
explained it must be explained by an ordering
power that is not within the universe.
Hartshorne’s answer to the problem of cosmic
order, and the answer favored by most process
theists, is that God’s unique role is to continually
bring order to the welter of non‐divine beings
scattered throughout the universe. Hartshorne
notes that there must be a difference in principle
between the scope of divine creativity and the
scope of any non‐divine creativity. It is true that on
neoclassical principles, all individuals, divine and
non‐divine, interact with other individuals. Non‐
divine individuals, however, are localized beings
that interact with some but not all other
individuals. For example, it is impossible to interact
with individuals that died before you were born or
that will be born after you die. This limitation does
not apply to God who, on the account of both
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traditional theism and neoclassical theism, was
never born and will never die. If, in addition to
having necessary existence, God is all‐inclusive and
thus omnipresent, then God’s influence would be
cosmic in scope. By interacting with all others, God
and God alone would be in the position to
guarantee order on a cosmic scale (Hartshorne
1967, 37‐40). Because process metaphysics posits
that no real being is merely acted upon, there is no
question of the cosmic order being deterministic.
This would simply reintroduce one of the most
troubling aspects of traditional theism, and process
thinkers are at pains to escape its antinomies
(Viney 2006c, 17‐20). Thus, the argument is not
that the self‐ordering activity of actual entities is in
need of explanation. The argument, rather, is that
the idea of cosmic order is not explicable in terms
of that activity, unless by an individual whose
influence is cosmic in scope.
Whitehead held that God should be the “chief
exemplification” of metaphysical principles, not an
exception to them that is invoked to save their
collapse (Whitehead 1978, 343). One advantage of
Hartshorne’s solution to the problem of cosmic
order is that it meets these requirements. The
relevant principles of process metaphysics that are
exemplified in God vis‐à‐vis the problem of cosmic
order are (1) all individuals act and are acted upon,
and (2) all individuals are partially self‐creative.
God, as the cosmic ordering power, is not an
exception to these principles but is their eminent
embodiment. I mentioned above that Hartshorne
thinks of the world as God’s body. For Hartshorne,
divine self‐formation makes of the world an
integrated whole. For him, “The world as an
integrated individual is not a ‘world’ as this term is
normally and properly used, but ‘God.’ God, the
World Soul, is the individual integrity of “the
world,” which otherwise is just the myriad of
creatures (1984, 59). Hartshorne’s mention of the
World Soul is an allusion to Plato’s theology, the
best insights of which Hartshorne viewed himself
as incorporating into his own philosophical
theology. By using Plato in this way, Hartshorne
departed from Whitehead (Viney 2004, section 4).
In any event, the context in which the neoclassical
God acts is manifestly not the “oppressively con‐
fined and local” one of which Hitchens complains
(2007a, 129).
How does Hartshorne’s view, as we have explained
it thus far, stand up to the New Atheist critique?
After all, some New Atheists believe that they have
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a philosophical trump up their sleeve that shows,
in Dawkins’ words, “why there almost certainly is
no God.” The philosophical argument, which is
borrowed from David Hume, is a version of the
“who designed the designer?” or the “who caused
God?” retorts. In Hitchens’ hyperbole, “the
postulate of a designer or creator only raises the
unanswerable question of who designed the
designer or created the creator” (2007a, 71).
According to Dawkins, any being that could bring
about the complex order of nature would be at
least as complex as the order that it is invoked to
explain. Trying to explain one example of complex
order by another, equally complex order, “is more
than a restatement of the problem, it is grotesque
amplification of it” (2006, 144). Put somewhat
differently, God, as the most complex being, would
be more improbable than the entities that God is
invoked to explain (2006, 147). God’s existence “is
going to need a mammoth explanation in its own
right” (2006, 149). Dawkins continues that “To
suggest that the original prime mover was
complicated enough to indulge in intelligent
design, to say nothing of mind‐reading millions of
humans simultaneously, is tantamount to dealing
yourself a perfect hand at bridge (2006, 155). In a
discussion of Dawkins’ original presentation of this
argument in The Blind Watchmaker (1986, 141),
Dennett called it “an unrebuttable refutation, as
devastating today as when Philo used it to trounce
Cleanthes in Hume’s Dialogues two centuries
earlier” (1995, 155).
Is this “unrebuttable refutation” really unre‐
buttable? Traditional theists have their own
rebutter (e.g. Crean 2007, 10‐19), but our concern
here is with neoclassical theism. Recall that the
question Hartshorne asks is how there can be
order on a cosmic scale. We have already noted
that the answer to this question leaves untouched
the varieties of localized order in the universe. Yet,
it is localized forms of order that most concern
Dawkins. He says that natural selection is “the
process which, as far as we know, is the only
process ultimately capable of generating
complexity out of simplicity” (2006, 150‐151).
Natural selection, however, presupposes the
existence of entities (usually organisms) interacting
with their environment and reacting to its
pressures. In other words, natural selection
presupposes an ordered universe. The God of
process theism has no location within the universe
and thus its complexity is not to be conceived as a
localized form of order. As Hartshorne argues, God
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as all‐inclusive has no external environment, only
an internal one (Hartshorne 1984, 134‐135). God’s
internal environment is nothing other than all of
the creatures that make up the universe at any
given stage of its existence. As we have seen, the
creatures, by interacting with God, contribute to
the divine actuality (which is complex), but they
cannot be the primordial explanation of the fact
that God has actual states (which is to say, the fact
that God exists). They cannot explain God’s
existence since they presuppose it—more
precisely, they presuppose a universe already
made (or in process terms, already making itself)
before they are born. Finally, we have also seen
that positing God as the cosmic ordering power is
not an arbitrary addition to neoclassical
metaphysics but a natural requirement flowing
from its basic principles.
So what about Hitchens’ “unanswerable question”
of who designed the designer, or what created the
creator? We should begin by asking whether this
question even makes sense. For example, the
question “What is north of the north pole?” is
grammatically correct, but it is geometrical
nonsense. Because of the nature of a globe, all
points on the sphere beyond the north pole are
south of it. Or again, the question, “What came
before the first moment of time?” is grammatically
correct, but it is metaphysical nonsense since “first
moment” implies that nothing occurred “before”
it—a point not lost on St. Augustine (Confessions,
bk. XI, chs. 12 and 13). In traditional theology, the
question, “Who created the creator?” is analogous.
It is grammatically unproblematic, but it is
metaphysical nonsense. To be sure, the question
makes sense if one assumes that everything has a
cause. Dennett’s misrepresentation of the
cosmological argument notwithstanding, no theist
of note accepts that premise. “God exists” and
“everything has a cause” are contraries; they
cannot both be true. In the context of Hartshorne’s
metaphysics, the question “Who designed the
designer?” should be rephrased: Who or what
made the order of the cosmic ordering power? This
question is not nonsensical, but it is subtly
ambiguous. Is God alone responsible for the basic
outlines of the cosmic order? Hartshorne answers
yes. Is God alone responsible for every way in
which order is brought from disorder? Hartshorne
answers no, since the creatures always retain some
power to act and not merely to be acted upon.
If the New Atheists’ Humean argument is
unsuccessful against neoclassical theism, one may
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still ask whether Hartshorne’s question about
cosmic order can be answered by science. For
example, in response to ID proponents, Stenger
argues that complex systems—both living and
nonliving—emerge from simpler ones by “a purely
natural process called self‐organization” (2007,
61). In the majority of plant species, for example,
leaves grow on stems in a way that, when viewed
from above, presents a double spiral pattern
twisting in opposite directions, as in a sunflower.
This unusual patterning seems to be driven by
purely physical, but non‐biological, mechanisms
(Stenger 2007, 62‐64). Stenger’s thesis is
interesting, in part, because it contradicts Dawkins’
claim that natural selection is the only known
process that can generate complexity from
simplicity. That, however, is a scientific issue. The
metaphysical question remains: whence cosmic
order? The appeal to self‐ordering systems is
unavailing as a solution to this problem. The
emergence of complex order from simple order
within the universe presupposes the very cosmic
order that Hartshorne’s metaphysical hypothesis
endeavors to explain.
Happily, Stenger does not use the idea of a
localized self‐ordering system to answer the
problem of cosmic order. He relies instead upon
current cosmology. He recounts the results of
modern astrophysics according to which the
galaxies are moving away from each other at
speeds approximately proportional to their
distances—in a word, the universe is expanding.
The second law of thermodynamics predicts that as
the universe expands, its total entropy increases.
Because the total possible entropy increases faster
than the total actual entropy, there is room for
immense localized order. When the curves for
possible and actual entropy are traced backwards
in time, they converge “to the smallest possible
region of space that can be operationally defined, a
Planck sphere” (Stenger 2007, 119). At this time,
the universe had as much entropy as an object of
that size could have; this is in contrast to the
present state of the universe which has less actual
entropy than an object of its size could have.
Stenger says that at the initial moment of maximal
entropy “the disorder [of the universe] was
complete and no structure could have been
present.” He goes on to characterize this as “a
state of chaos” (2007, 121).
Stenger is usually careful to couch scientific results
in terms of what can and cannot be measured by
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current instruments or what is and is not allowed
by current theories. We have just seen, for
example, that when speaking of a Planck sphere as
“the smallest possible region of space,” he adds
“that can operationally be defined.” Likewise, he
says that “the earliest definable moment” is the
Planck time” (2007, 119)—Stenger would have
been even more precise had he written “definable
by current physics.” Later, he says,
Basically, by definition time is counted off as an
integral number of units where one unit equals
the Planck time. We can get away with treating
time as a continuous variable in our
mathematical physics, such as we do when we
use calculus, because the units are so small
compared to anything we measure in practice.
We essentially extrapolate our equations
through the Planck intervals within which time is
unmeasurable and thus indefinable (2007, 120‐
121).

Again,
greater
precision
demands
that
“indefinable” be changed to “indefinable by
current physics.” No mere philosophical fussiness
requires these clarifications. Stenger says that in
physics, “time is simply the count of ticks on a
clock” (2007, 123). Granted that judgments in
physics are tied to what can be measured, it would
be intellectually reckless to conclude that time is
nothing more than what physics can measure. The
question remains whether or not the
unmeasurable “intervals” that Stenger mentions
exist. Or again, one should not conclude that time
really is continuous simply because “we can get
away with” treating it as such for the purposes of
doing physics.
What holds for Stenger’s explanations of time
holds mutatis mutandis for his explanations of the
disorder of the universe at the earliest measurable
time. The “disorder” or “chaos” that Stenger
identifies within the Planck sphere should not be
described as “complete” but as “complete as
known to physics.” All that Stenger is justified in
saying is the latter, not the former. To put the
point somewhat differently, there is no meaningful
difference between “complete disorder” or
“complete chaos” and non‐being. On the other
hand, “complete disorder as known to physics”
does contrast with non‐being since there may be a
deeper order beneath the order detectable by
physics. It seems clear, at any rate, that Stenger
does not identify the disorder or chaos of the initial
Planck sphere with non‐being. Stenger is skeptical
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that the big bang represents an absolute beginning
(2007, 125) and he speculates that our universe
“‘tunneled’ through the chaos at the Planck time
from a prior universe that existed for all previous
time” (2007, 126). Presumably, our universe could
not “tunnel through” something that did not exist.
“Tunneling through” is a metaphor, but it
presumably describes some ordered relation. If
there is indeed an ordered relation between our
side and the far side (so to speak) of the big bang
singularity, then Hartshorne’s problem of cosmic
order resurfaces. By as much as Stenger’s scientific
reconstruction of the cosmic past falls short of a
metaphysical account, so does it fail to answer the
question that Hartshorne raises about cosmic
order.
The twentieth century founders of process
philosophy and those who continue their project
engage in metaphysics. The New Atheists are wary
of metaphysical claims, and so they press scientific
explanations as far as they can go. Neoclassical
philosophers should have no objection to this.
After all, the founders of neoclassicism, as we have
seen, were friends and practitioners of science.
Neoclassical philosophers add, however, that it is
equally important to be wary of the claim that
science alone is the arbiter of what we can
reasonably judge to be true or false. This is
scientism. Of course, scientism is not itself a
deliverance of science or of scientific investigation
but a thesis about the competencies of science. It
follows that scientism, by the very standards it sets
up for judging what is true and false (i.e. scientific
ones) cannot be judged as true or false. It is, at
best, a proposal for thinking about science, a
proposal that neoclassical thinkers reject.
Moreover, because scientism is not a product of
science, denying scientism in no way commits one
to any sort of backward thinking about science. (An
interesting question to explore that goes beyond
the scope of this paper is the extent to which the
denial of scientism can save one from backward
thinking about both science and metaphysics).
One of the glories of science is that its methods
often lead reasonable people to agreement on
difficult empirical questions. Metaphysics does not
have this advantage. Its methods are more
controversial, its theories are more removed from
empirical disconfirmation, and its practitioners are
in continual disagreement. To be sure, it is logically
rigorous in the minimal senses that contrary views
cannot be true and that it employs rational

ISSN 1445‐4297

© Donald Wayne Viney, 2008.

19

HOW NOT TO BE AN ATHEIST
methods of inquiry. As it is practiced by
neoclassical philosophers it is also attentive to the
deliverances of science in the minimal sense that it
strives to be supportive of them. On the other
hand, it is epistemically messy in the sense that
equally informed reasonable people can come to
contrary conclusions. This is reason enough to
agree with Whitehead when he says that, in
philosophy, “the merest hint of dogmatic certainty
as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly”
(Whitehead 1978, xiv). Whitehead’s warning is not,
however, a counsel of despair. Despite the
difficulty of metaphysics and the apparently
intractable disagreements that characterize
competing viewpoints, its questions are legitimate,
its problems are genuine, and its speculations
deserve serious response.
Whitehead’s call to intellectual humility is a
reminder that theologians and religious people
informed by process thought (not alone
Whitehead’s) are neither anti‐scientific nor rabid
zealots. On the contrary, they have a very good
track record of promoting scientific curiosity,
responsible moral thinking, and high ideals about
economic development, ecological management,
and social justice. Neoclassical thinkers agree with
Whitehead’s assessment of progressive religion
that “Religion will not regain its old power until it
can face change in the same spirit as does science.
Its principles may be eternal, but the expression of
those principles requires continual development”
(1925, 270). Whitehead himself was a role‐model
of this attitude in his adventurous approach to
religion (Viney 2005). The same is true of Teilhard
and of Hartshorne. The God they envisioned—
different versions of the God of process thought—
is a very long way from what Haught described as
“the one‐planet deity of our terrestrial religions”
(2003, 161).
There are many facets of the New Atheists’ attack
on religion that go beyond the scope of this paper,
but which cry out for response from a neoclassical
perspective. Perhaps I have already said enough to
suggest how neoclassical thinkers would respond
to some of these attacks. For example, Whitehead
was no less critical than the New Atheists of the
crimes done in the name of religion (1996, 37‐38).
But he would have recognized Hitchens’ claim that
“religion poisons everything” for the histrionics
that it is. Of course, it is also self‐referentially
curious since Hitchens is inadvertently making a
case against himself. If religion poisons everything,
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then it also poisons Hitchens’ claim, and the
arguments he makes for his claim, that religion
poisons
everything.
Hitchens’
clumsy
animadversions aside, Whitehead tried to tap
religion’s finer insights—those that build great
culture and those that ennoble the human spirit.
We have seen that process thought construes
divine power, for example, in very different terms
than the dominant tradition in theology conceived
it. God’s power, Whitehead said, is the worship
that God inspires, and religions that emphasize this
are the ones that should command our respect. For
him, “The worship of God is not a rule of safety—it
is an adventure of the spirit, a flight after the
unattainable” (1925, 276). Whitehead could as well
have been reading Paul when he said that; Paul
attributes these words to Jesus that are not in the
Gospels: “My grace is sufficient for you, for my
power is made perfect in weakness” (II Cor. 12:9).
The New Atheists criticize religions grounded in
brute strength and the threat of punishment. How
different than these are religions grounded in love!
What do they look like? What will they look like? In
1934, Teilhard wrote of such religion stating,
“Someday, after having mastered space [l’éther],
the winds, the tides, gravitation, we will capture
for God the energies of love—And then, for a
second time in the history of the World, we
[l’Homme] will have discovered Fire” (1973, 92).
My rather modest aim here has been to take these
neoclassical perspectives on God and religion
seriously and to invite the New Atheists to do the
same. At the very least, I hope that in sketching a
major contemporary theistic alternative that is
overlooked by the New Atheists I have given some
sense of its sophistication, its intellectual power,
and its nobility.
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